Assessing a Chinese Emerging Technology Sector (Semiconductor)

1. Introduction

Semiconductors are the essential electronics components, ranging from mobile phones to vehicles. The semiconductor industry is often combined with integrated circuits, commonly known as chips. Semiconductors are increasingly becoming an element of national security and strategic development. However, the value chain of semiconductors has been expanded to a global scale.

The extensive and complex global value chain is built on an international division of labor due to the innovation capacity and specialization, which has created a cross-border interdependence. For example, a typical semiconductor supply chain runs from U. S’s design to Taiwan’s manufactures, which use chemicals from Japan and Germany, and equipment from the Netherlands and final assembled in China.

The transnational nature of semiconductors contradicts the national interest. One particular case is China. The Chinese government sees semiconductors as a “strategic importance” for breaking the global checkpoint on preventing China from becoming a global technological powerhouse. However, China’s aspiration on self-reliance on the semiconductors industry is unclear without a comprehensive understanding of China’s semiconductor ecosystem, key components and strengths, and weaknesses of the industry.

This policy memo provides an overview of China’s development in semiconductors. The first section explains China’s domestic innovation ecosystem, focusing on state-led policy, key state organization, research and development, and the catalytic factors. The second section is devoted to analyzing China’s strengths and weaknesses in the different production steps and providing an analytical framework for concluding the strategic implications.

2. Overview of China’s semiconductor development

Semiconductors have been the development priority of Chinese leadership for several decades. However, the progress in closing the gap with foreign leading companies that occupy critical positions across the value chain remains limited. In the following paragraph, the memo describes how state-led policy operates across the entire sector by focusing on the critical state and private organizations, research and development base, and catalytic factors.

In 2014, the State Council, China’s cabinet, issued the National Integrated Circuit Industry Development Outline. This is treated as the start of the current phase of China’s semiconductor policy, in which lesser direct state intervention and extensive state-led funding across the supply chain rather than selected firms[1].

The 2014 Outline aimed to improve centralized policy coordination by establishing a national steering committee, a leadership small group (LSG) supported by an expert advisory committee. The IC industry LSG’s director was the Vice-Premier of the State Council and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Politburo member, Ma Kai. The deputy director is the head of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), Miao Wei. The composition of the leadership small group revealed the connection between semiconductors and the broader electronics and manufacturing sectors. In 2021, another leadership small group is founded to coordinate the development of semiconductors. The group is headed by Liu He, the chief economic adviser to Chinese President Xi Jinping. The LSG aims to “reform the national science and technology system and build an innovation system.” Although the division of labor and responsibility between 2014 LSG and 2021 LSG remains unclear, several subnational governments have established similar LSGs[2].

The 2014 Outline targets chip design, fabrication, packaging and test, manufacturing equipment, and materials[3]. It aims to upgrade the sectors across the value chain through direct financing, tax relief, and state-linked equity investment funds at both national and sub-national levels. As such, a National Integrated Circuit Industrial Investment Fund was established with registered capital of RMB 98.72 billion, around USD 15 billion[4].

The National Integrated Circuit Industrial Investment Fund is an example of the “government guidance fund.” Such funds adopt the limited partnership structure, commonly found in global equity financial arrangements. However, in the context of China, they are established as anchor capital and provide a window for state agencies to influence investment decisions. In other words, although private sectors and foreign investors are part of the investment, state-owned capital play a more dominant role[5].

The government guidance fund is overseen by the MIIT and the Ministry of Finance[6]. Most of the shareholders are state-owned enterprises. A major share of the capital come from the Ministry of Finance and China Development Bank (CDB)[7]. The managing entity of the Semiconductor fund has been run consecutively by two executives from CDB, which also own 45% share of the fund.

In addition to funding, the State Council issued the Made in China 2025 (MiC 2025) industrial upgrading roadmap. Although the MiC 2025 is seldom mentioned now, his plan stipulates that China needs to achieve 40% self-sufficiency in IC consumption by 2020 and 70% by 2025[8]. A supplemented program formulated by the Chinese Academy of Engineering described more specific targets. In 2017, a national “IC Industry Technical Innovation Strategic Alliance” was established to coordinate among research and industry actors with the aim of “making China’s IC industry technology innovation capabilities reach internationally leading levels in 5-10 years”[9].

3. The strengths and weaknesses of China’s semiconductors industry

3.1 Strengths

3.1.1 State-push strategy

National policy is essential for researching fields with higher risk. Since 2014, China’s evolving approach to building its semiconductor sector has been characterized as a fast-follower strategy, which recognizes the structural barriers to reaching the global technological frontier and the advantages of focusing at least initially on lower value-added positions in the global value chain[10].

In the 14th Five-Year Plan (FTP), semiconductors are treated as an independent category, one of seven frontier technologies prioritized for national breakthroughs. Following the plan, the MIIT presents the 14th Five-Year Plan for Science and Technology Innovation (14th FYP S&TI), which addresses priorities set in the 14th FYP. The 14th FYP S&TI also discusses the post-Moore era of semiconductors[11]. This refers to alternative materials and techniques that will potentially allow IC design to transcend the growing physical challenges to increasing computing power that is expressed in Morre’s Law. Success in such alternative pathways might open up opportunities to leapfrog China’s lag in existing processes or at least to capture a leading position in emerging markets[12].

In this context, the 14th FYP prioritizes the “development of silicon carbide, gallium nitride, and other wide-bandgap semiconductors[13].” Such third-generation semiconductors are also targeted in IC industry development plans issued by multiple subnational governments. In addition to the 14th FYP S&TI, China is likely to issue a new National Medium & Long-term Plan for Science and Technology Development (NMLTP) for the period 2021-2035[14]. A new national special project for semiconductor will likely be key elements shaping policy for this sector.

3.1.2 China’s important role in the global electronic supply chain

China is an essential manufacturing powerhouse. It produces 36% of the world’s electronics, ranging from smartphones to telecom infrastructures, which all require semiconductors[15]. In addition, China is also the second-largest consumption market for electronic devices embedded with semiconductors[16].

While China is behind the global frontier in chips design and fabrication, it has notable strengths in the assembly, packaging, and testing stage (OSAT). China’s leading OSAT players are ranked among the top 10 OSAT companies in the world, collectively holding 38% of the total OSAT market in 2020[17].

The Chinese authorities are also trying to maintain the leading global position in packaging. The city of Zhuhai’s 2020-2025 IC Development Plan aims to build an RMB 10 billion manufacturing cluster around compound semiconductors, modular manufacturing, and packaging and test[18]. Multiple subnational governments are providing subsidies for OSAT-related development, such as specific references to applications and materials that were prioritized in the 14th Five-Year Plan.

3.1.3 Coordination with other emerging technologies sectors.

Under the national and subnational government’s planning, China’s IC sector is likely to be more cooperative and synergistic among Chinese firms at different domestic semiconductor value chain positions. Furthermore, the semiconductors industry can also leverage sectors that rely on semiconductors developments, such as intelligent manufacturing, the Internet of Things, and self-driving vehicles. The whole ecosystem, the demand-led approach, is facilitated by the large and mature domestic value chain that supports commercial expansion and technical development. Moreover, the presence of Chinese digital products and firms in foreign markets is unlikely to be entirely curtailed by U.S. political pressure, although the pressure is expected to grow[19].

3.2 Weaknesses

3.2.1 Lack of accountability

China is determined to develop a leading-edge semiconductor ecosystem. The recent Five-Year Plan has channeled funding to Chinese firms which pursue chip-related projects. However, the lack of accountability induces fraud.

Wuhan Hongxin Semiconductor, which hired TSMC CTO Chiang Shang-Yi as its CEO and promised to deliver 14-nanometer chips, was exposed as a fraud and went bankrupt in late 2020[20]. Similarly, Tsinghua ingroup, a firm that received a large amount of state capital, recently defaulted on a mainland-issued bond[21].

Beijing’s call on the self-sufficiency of chip supplies and the following “Great Leap Forward”- style national fervor on semiconductors have driven many local governments to rush into the high-tech field, leaving room for opportunities.[22]. China’s News Weekly reported that at least six semiconductor startups across the country have come to a halt[23]. In light of the current situation, NDRC warned that local governments that support semiconductor projects would be held accountable should significant losses and risks occur[24].

3.2.2 Talent Shortage

Another weakness that poses a challenge to China’s ambition to achieve self-sufficiency in semiconductors is a chronic shortage of talent.

The talent shortage has long been a problem for China’s semiconductor industry. In light of the situation, Beijing is taking steps to develop more homegrown semiconductor talents. In 2020, the government approved China’s IC university program, elevating IC design and production as a recognized major. The aim is to boost the attractiveness of IC-focused education to Chinese students. This policy will be implemented in October 2020 by establishing China’s first IC university, Nanjing Integrated Circuit University[25]. This university selects university and college students interested in working in the semiconductor industry and prepares them with related knowledge. The vocational syllabus will be taught by experienced chip engineers, industry experts, and university professors[26]. Similarly, in April 2021, one of China’s leading microelectronics schools at Tsinghua University set up a new IC Institute to promote “cross-fertilization of basic research and cutting-edge engineering technology across many fields”[27].

In addition to the homegrown talent, China also aims to attract overseas chip engineers, especially Taiwan engineers. Chinese chip companies attract Taiwanese semiconductor engineers with high-paying positions. According to the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research, around 10% of the Taiwanese engineers engaged in Semiconductor research and development are hired to China[28]. TSMC, in particular, has been the most high-profile target for Chinese chip companies looking to secure talent. Quanxin Integrated Circuit Manufacturing and Wuhan Hongxin Semiconductor Manufacturing have each hired more than 50 former TSMC employees, with both at one point led by former TSMC executives[29].

Although the massive funding allows the industry to train homegrown talents and attract engineers from overseas, the country remains a shortfall of semiconductor top talents. According to a report published by the China Institute for Educational Finance Research at Peking University, the shortage of talents doubled from 150,000 in 2015 to 300,000 in 2019[30]. China Center for Information Industry Development predicts the demand of the workforce in 2022 will increase to 745,000[31]. However, only 512,000 people work in the semiconductor industry at the end of 2019[32].

The quality of talent is also an essential constraint. Mid-and senior-level engines at semiconductor fabrication plants are still typically Taiwanese, Japanese, and Korea expatriates[33]. Domestically trained expertise is also unlikely to substitute soon for top-level talent nurtured at leading firms outside mainland China, particularly PRC citizens who have returned to work in China and Taiwanese.

3.2.3 Insufficient R&D funding

China is focusing on developing the IC sector as an integrated ecosystem. But the underlying R&D resources remain deficient. One 2019 estimate, the entire Chinese semiconductor sector’s R&D spending was less than that of a single U.S. company, Intel[34]. The U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association estimates that U.S. chip companies, on average, spent about 20% of their revenue on R&D in 2019. Some spend much more, for example, Marvell spent around 40% in 2020, Nvidia 26%, and AMD 23%. Chinese fabless companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen, however, have average R&D spending of 17.5% of revenue in 2020[35].

However, some innovation indices indicate that Chinese actors are increasing their contribution to the global IP pool for semiconductor technologies. For example, semiconductor-related filings with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office by applicants based in China rose 30% compared to 2020, although they still accounted for less than 10% of total applications[36].

4. Conclusion

China has a significantly stronger position across the entire semiconductor value chain today. Despite persistent inefficiencies and weaknesses in the Chinese ecosystem for R&D and production, China should be expected to continue strengthening its national position in the global value chain during these decades.

China will continue to invest in its domestic semiconductor ecosystem, with different strategic planning and policies. In so doing, China’s readiness to punish other countries and their firms for real or perceived measures that discriminate against Chinese entities will also be increased. In addition, in June 2021, China adopted a Counter-Sanctions Law that empowers Chinese authorities to claim damages or seize assets from entities deemed to be aiding enforcement of measures by a foreign government that are deemed discriminatory to Chinese interests[37]. This potentially includes export and investment controls concerning semiconductors.

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[20] Staff Writer Taiwan News, “China Gives up Ambitious $20 Billion Semiconductor Investment Project,” Taiwan News (Taiwan News, February 28, 2021), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4138523. [21] Chad Bray, “China Chip Maker Tsinghua Unigroup to Default on US$450 Million Debt,” South China Morning Post, December 10, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3113357/china-chip-maker-tsinghua-unigroup-default-us450-million. [22] Kathrin Hille, “Chinese Groups Go from Fish to Chips in New 'Great Leap Forward',” Subscribe to read | Financial Times (Financial Times, October 12, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/46edd2b2-1734-47da-8e77-21854ca5b212. [23] 瞭望 , “六个百亿级项目坍塌　‘中国芯‘遭遇烂尾潮,” _新浪财经_新浪网, September 30, 2020, https://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/2020-09-30/doc-iivhvpwy9799323.shtml. 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[27] “Tsinghua Sets up School to Support Semiconductor Self-Sufficiency in China,” Caixin Global - Latest Business and Financial News on China, U.S. Trade War and Negotiations, Breaking News, Headlines and Developments, accessed December 8, 2021, https://www.caixinglobal.com/2021-04-26/tsinghua-sets-up-school-to-support-semiconductor-self-sufficiency-in-china-101700076.html.; “ Eyeing ‘China Chips’, Tsinghua Establishes Institute of Integrated Circuit,” 瞄准"中國芯"，清華大學成立集成電路學院--教育--人民網, accessed December 8, 2021, http://edu.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2021/0422/c1006-32085204.html. [28] Keoni Everington, “China Poaches 3,000 Chip Engineers, but Taiwan Winning from Trade War: Taiwan News: 2019-12-03 17:36:00,” Taiwan News (Taiwan News, December 3, 2019), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3829558. [29] Ting-Fang Cheng, “Over 100 TSMC Engineers Poached by Chinese Mainland Rivals Striving for Chip Leadership,” Caixin Global, 2020, https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-08-12/china-hires-over-100-tsmc-engineers-in-push-for-chip-leadership-101591851.html. [30] Che Pan, “China Faces Severe Talent Shortage as Its Semiconductor Ambitions Grow,” South China Morning Post, October 18, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-war/article/3152782/chinas-semiconductor-industry-faces-growing-talent-shortage-beijing. [31] Ibid [32] Che Pan, “Peking University Joins Country's Wave to Create New Semiconductor Schools,” South China Morning Post, July 16, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-trends/article/3141404/peking-university-joins-chinas-semiconductor-push-new-school. [33] Sarah Ravi, “Webinar Examining China's Semiconductor Self-Sufficiency: Present and Future Prospects,” Semiconductor Industry Association, accessed December 8, 2021, https://www.semiconductors.org/events/sia-webinar-examining-chinas-semiconductor-self-sufficiency-the-present-and-future-prospects/. [34] TF Securities, “. Semiconductors–Forging Ahead, Supporting the Investment Layout of the Integrated Circuit Industry Fund,” TF Securities, 2019, https://forum.huawei.com/enterprise/zh/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=675471&extra=page&page=15. [35] Stewart Randall, “Silicon: Are Chinese Chipmakers Spending Enough on R&D? · Technode,” TechNode, September 10, 2021, https://technode.com/2021/09/10/silicon-are-chinese-chipmakers-spending-enough-on-rd/. [36] IAM-Media, “Data Reveals Patenting in Semiconductors Is on the Rise, with Asia Accelerating Its Output,” Data Reveals Patenting in Semiconductors Is on the Rise, with Asia Accelerating its Output, 2021, https://www.iam-media.com/market-developments/data-reveals-patenting-in-semiconductors-tear-asia-accelerating-its-output. [37] Staff Writer, “China Anti-Sanctions Law to Put Squeeze on Foreign Companies,” Nikkei Asia (Nikkei Asia, June 11, 2021), https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-anti-sanctions-law-to-put-squeeze-on-foreign-companies.

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