Too Big to Target: How Chinese Tech Giants Become the Target of Regulation?

1. Introduction

The Chinese government used to support Chinese information technology companies' international expansion and sales endeavors. Companies such as Alibaba and Tencent are fostered as the "national champions." However, since Xi Jinping, the People's Republic of China president, entered his second term, the attitude and policies gradually shifted away from support. When Jack Ma told China's financial top officials on October 24, 2020, that their incompetence had created a severely underdeveloped financial system and Ant Finance would be the pill, his speech flagged the tipping point when Beijing shifted its relations to big tech firms to heavy-headed regulation[1]. After Ant's IPO incident, more new guidelines and regulations were published in 2021. Even if some target only tech-adjacent industries such as digital education, are, in fact coming together under one flag. In addition, new laws are implemented with unprecedented frequency by the Cyberspace Administration of China and State Administration for Market Regulation, such as rules for Livestream e-commerce, platform economy antitrust guidelines, and guidelines for fair competition. As a result of this fierce attack against technology companies, more than 1 trillion U.S. dollars was wiped off[2].

This paper systematically analyzes the policy differences toward tech giants Alibaba and Tencent. By looking into how the leadership perceives Chinese technology giants over time and how party institutions make decisions, this paper argues that the apparent shifted attitude of central leadership on tech giants is by no means a surprise which is consistent with its underlying innovation-driven economic development model. The crackdown on large companies in fintech-lending and e-commerce, social media, and video gaming is an approach to create market competition, in turn stimulating innovation, which is the exact same reason for the initial support to tech giants. In addition, this paper will also focus on how government departments such as MIIT, CAC, SAMR, CSRC, and NPPA implement the decisions. Lastly, the paper will also discuss how the regulations influence ordinary people in and outside of China.

The following paper is structured into five parts. The first part presents the government's supportive policies toward tech giants during Xi's first term. It follows the graduate shift from supportive to soft regulations during the first and second-term transition years. The third section devotes to presenting the current policy and enforcement agencies. The last section prior to the conclusion aims to explain and present the shift of leadership perception tech giants.

2. The Good Old Days

In 2014, Alibaba held the world record for the largest opening day IPO, and Tencent’s WeChat achieved more mobile transactions over the Chinese New Year than PayPal did in all of 2015. Venture Capital investment value in China-based internet businesses was worth USD 20 billion in 2015, exceeding Venture Capital investment in United State-based internet business, USD 16 billion[3].

Although the rise of China’s internet firms cannot be solely attributed to the result of industrial policy from Beijing, China’s industrial policy played a considerable in the success story. As one of the sectors in strategic emerging industrials (SEI), the sector is heavily supported by the state industrial policy, such as Internet Plus, Made in China 2025, and the National IT Development Strategy. The most notable policy document is the Decision on Accelerating the Developing of Strategic Emerging Industries[4]. This document signals the central government’s determination to Chinese government agencies at all levels that SEI will enjoy preferential policies, ranging from taxation, human resources, and research and development.

Under this decision, an inter-ministerial coordination group headed by the National Development and Reform Commission, with members from the Ministry of Commerce, Science and Technologies, and Industry and Information technology. Each of these government agencies has a specific responsibility. For example, NDRC assigns much of the SEI-related oversight to the Department of High-Tech Industry. MIIT, however, is more compartmentalized, with several separate departments responsible for planning, policy, and standards within their respective SEI sectors, such as the Department of Software Services[5].

Since 2010, various central agencies had published SEI-related policy guidance shortly before Xi assumed power[6]. Fiscal policy, particularly tax policy, was the primary tool to support industry innovation and technology commercialization. Meanwhile, as suggested in the Interim Measures for the Administration of Special Funds for Strategic Emerging Industries, SEI funding would be jointly supported by central and local government coffers, such as, the Hubei Special Fund for Major Science and Technology Project, and the Shanghai Special Fund for the Development of Major Projects of Indigenous Innovation and High & New Technology Industries[7]. Subsequently, in 2015, the State Council further issued a call for ministries and local governments at “all levels” to support innovation and start-ups, with fast-growing companies like e-commerce giant Alibaba[8].

Apart from the government’s financial support, China’s information and technology sector is also leveraging the country’s fast-growing and isolated markets to build market power and drive innovations with global reach.

China’s big and successful internet companies have benefited from the Chinese government’s effort to exclude competition from Silicon Valley’s finest tech companies, such as Facebook, Goggle, Twitter, and YouTube. They are all blocked in China. Baidu, the largest search engine company in China, directly benefits China’s decision to block Google in 2010 after the company refused to censor its search results[9].

The Chinese government also protected tech companies from foreign regulations. In December 2011, the U.S Trade Representative labeled Alibaba’s e-commerce platform, Taobao, as a “notorious market” for listing pirated goods[10]. In January 2012, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce criticized the U.S. Trade Representative for the Taobao label and said that the United States should “make fair assessments and avoid creating an unnecessary negative effect for Chinese companies[11].”

3. The changes of wind direction

Before the recent comprehensive crackdown, the Chinese government was graduate moving to limit the clout of China’s tech sector. In December 2014 and January 2015, the Chinese government published two general e-commerce monitoring studies and a critical official report specifically about counterfeits on Taobao, indicating a more decisive government action against counterfeits. However, the report was initially delayed for months and then deleted the same day it was published.

On January 28, 2015, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) published the “Regarding Alibaba Group Ongoing Administrative Guidance Work Situation White Paper.[12]” The White Paper was based on a meeting at which Liu Hongliang, the SAIC e-commerce department director, reportedly said Alibaba could be issued fines totaling 1 percent of Alibaba’s daily transactions[13]. In addition, the White Paper also stated the current situation represented “Alibaba’s largest credibility crisis since its founding” and identified five significant areas of concern: registration control, supervision of product information, sales management, flaws in ratings, and employee management[14]. Alongside the publication of the White Paper, Chinese state media also criticized Alibaba for “bullying others by flexing their financial muscle[15].” Similarly, Tencent, a tech giant that owns many game platforms, was also targeted by government regulations. Its role-playing game, Honor of Kings, was condemned as “poisonous[16].” After the regulatory attack by the authority, Tencent lost about $15billion in market capitalization[17]. Since the Honor of King’s criticism, there are further regulations on tech firms. Alibaba’s Taobao e-commerce platform was rapped for selling banned tokens for virtual private networks[18].

4. The Current Regulation

The recent regulatory crackdown has surprised many Chinese observers and investors. Hundreds of companies have been fined around USD 3 billion, and Apps have been taken off from stores, and Jack Ma, the symbol of Alibaba, was missing for three months[19]. Regulation is also far beyond the scope and size of previous attempts, and the government targets not just individual companies or apps but entire industries and ecosystems. A range of antitrust guidelines and rules have been introduced that e-commerce platforms, social media providers, and live-streaming services must obey.

Disentangling the web of regulations reveals consolidation of institutional power and the progressive implementation of a broad legal framework. Unlike the previous crackdown, which mainly uses state media editorial, guidance from ministries, and White paper, the overall shape of the campaign of this time is based on laws and regulations. All laws, such as Personal Information Protection Law, Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, Anti-Monopoly Law, and Anti-Unfair Competition Law, are introduced within these three years[20]. The crackdown is the regulators trying to enforce and test this power.

5. Perception changes

5.1 Amendments for regulation gap

China's tech giants become regulatory challenges from the engine of economic growth. China's digital economy has experienced immense growth over the past decade. New business models developed rapidly, and labor markets and financial systems underwent paradigm shifts. However, with these changes came a host of "regulatory problems[21]." By setting tight delivery times, the algorithms of Chinese online delivery apps encourage their delivery person to speed dangerously, resulting in more traffic accidents. The recent deaths of two young employees at Pinduoduo, a rising Chinese e-retailer and formidable competitor to Alibaba, have sparked a heated debate about the culture of overworking at Chinese tech firms[22].

Consequently, the government is keen to tackle using different new bodies applying several new laws. The State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), for example, was only founded in 2018 and tackles market regulations. It enforces the Anti-Unfair Competition Law that has been in effect since 2019. The SAMR has successfully investigated more than 3000 cases of unfair competition and collected CNY 206 million in fines in the first half of 2021[23]. It has also used the new E-Commerce Law, effective since 2019, and the Anti-Monopoly Law. Meanwhile, China's new cyber administration, Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), has focused on implementing the 2017 Cyber Security Law and the 2021 Data Security Law. It found ordered Didi, China's biggest ride-hailing app, and its related app to be taken offline[24].

5.2 Regulation facilitate innovation

With the rapid expansion of China's tech giants, the market is increasingly over-concentrated in the tech sector, which stiffens innovation. The enormous commercial success of Chinese online tech businesses such as Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent has resulted in a high concentration of wealth and capital. These three companies, collectively known as BAT, form insatiable investment teams, and these investment teams look for promising startups. The tech triumvirate has already invested, directly or indirectly, in half of the 124 startups counted as "unicorns.[25]" By the time firms hit the $5 billion mark, over 80% had taken a form of BAT investment[26]. Among the triumvirate, Tencent and Alibaba moved out of their core businesses into areas as varied as bike-sharing, ridesharing, and food delivery. Compared to the U.S., American giants make just 5% of all domestic VC investments, whereas BAT's account for half of those in China[27].

Alibaba and Tencent offer more than just large cheques. Their platforms have become irresistible. WeChat counts over 1 billion users, and Alibaba's emporia are home to 1 million merchants[28]. They account for 94% of mobile transactions through WeChat Pay and Alipay[29]. The reliance on big tech companies' platforms erodes the ambitions of startups. Fewer startups are trying to build a platform of users because replying on traffic of WeChat and Alipay is more cost-efficient. As ambition shrinks within startups, innovation suffers.

5.3 Propel innovation self-reliance

Although China's tech firms have achieved enormous success in market valuation and software development, companies such as Tencent and Alibaba have yet to develop foundational technologies, which contradict the government's expectation, especially when the government highlights the real economy. China's fragility in technological innovation was exposed during the Sino-American trade war. National champions such as ZTE and Huawei could be easily interrupted if the U.S. government withholds the supply of critical components such as semiconductors.

China's weakness in technological innovation explains Beijing's recent emphasis on achieving technological self-reliance and its desire to regulate in this direction. Since China is a country apart from the U.S. which develops sophisticated Internet Chinese tech giants firms, these tech firms are well-positioned to develop digital technologies for the country. As urged by an editorial in People's Daily, the Communist Party mouthpiece, Chinese tech giants must forge higher ambitions, such as advancing technological innovation to clear China's bottleneck, rather than investing in "community group-buying" (tuangou) or focusing on selling cabbages[30].

The antitrust law enforcement gives Beijing significant regulatory leverage to push its tech firms toward the government desires. Antitrust law grants the central government strong sanctioning powers, allowing it to impose anything from astronomical monetary fines to severe structural remedies. The Chinese antitrust regulator also possesses vast administrative discretion while being subject to little judicial oversight. Furthermore, Chinese antitrust law enforcement is spearheaded by a central ministry that carefully follows the central government's directives.

Chinese tech giants have amassed significant market power, so they have become vulnerable to antitrust regulatory attacks. The regulatory vulnerability of Chinese Big Tech, in turn, facilitates their cooperation with Beijing to help the latter achieve its goals, be it in antitrust or other industrial policy matters.

6. Conclusion

In recent months, the Chinese government has moved forcefully to enforce anti-monopoly intervention and pro-innovation opening of big company chokeholds on digital information. However, the policy stance is not a drastic change, and it represents a continuation of Xi’s encouragement on “passion for innovation” and the grand development strategy, innovation-driven economic development. Tech companies, such as Tencent, and Alibaba, which used to be part of the champions among start-ups, become giants that stiff competition and hinder innovation. As a consequence, tech giants become the regulator’s target.

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